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Bu çalıs¸mamızda sosyal refah fonksiyonlarıyla ilgili bir kos¸ul, Kemeny istikrarı diye adlandırdıg˘ımız
bir kos¸ul tanıtıyoruz. Bu kos¸ul, temel olarak Kemeny uzaklıg˘ını baz alır ve bizim yüksek-tercihler
dedig˘imiz tercih s¸ekliyle alakalıdır. Sosyal refah kurallarının istikrarlarına yönelik bir özellik olan
bu uygunug˘u sag˘layan kuralların hangileri oldug˘u, sag˘lamayanların hangileri oldug˘u aras¸tırılmıs¸tır.
Farklı yöntemlerle bu kos¸ulu tanımladık ve inceledik. Sonuç olarak, skorlama kurallarının hiç
birinin bu kos¸ulu sag˘layamadıg˘ı tesbit edilmis¸tir. Öte yandan Condorcet tipi kuralların bu kos¸ulu
sag˘layan bazı kuralları içerebileceg˘i gözlemlenmis¸tir. Bununla birlikte genel olarak bu kos¸ulu
sag˘layan kurallara ilis¸kin özellikler aras¸tırılmıs¸tır. Ve bu hususta bir es¸les¸tirme yolunda bulgular
elde edilmis¸tir. Bu bag˘lamda, bir güçlü tarafsızlık kos¸ulunun Kemeny istikrarı kos¸ulu için yeterli
bir kos¸ul oldug˘u gösterilmis¸tir. Bütün bunlarla ilgili olarak literatürde var olan çalıs¸malarla ilgili
bilgiler derlenmis¸ ve takdim edilmis¸tir.
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Abstract
We introduce a consistency condition for social welfare functions; called Kemeny stability. This
notion rests upon the Kemeny distance for rankings and a preference scheme, hyper-preferences
as we call. It’s been studied what rules satisfy this stability condition and which rules don’t. We
considered different ways of proposing this condition. As a result of our research, it’s been shown
that no scoring rule satisfies the condition of Kemeny stability. On the other hand, we found out
that there exists Condorcet type social welfare functions which satisfy our condition. On the other
hand, general characteristics of the rules satisfying the condition also has been studied and some
results are achieved. In this context, a strong neutrality condition is shown to be sufficient. A
literature search related to all these aspects also accomplished and presented in this work.
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1 Introduction
Think of a collective decision situation where individuals are required to
rank alternatives in a way to represent their preferences. By determining the
restrictions on preference submission individuals are immediately forced to
reveal their preferences in certain ways. For instance the preference scheme
inquired is the major restriction one can think of; let’s say individuals are
asked to submit a complete ranking. Then he is left with only a set of
admissible rankings. Henceforth he is to determine which of the rankings
is the best one in reflecting his preferences. So to speak, individuals are
to compare, or rank, these rankings according to their tastes. This is an
alternative view to spectate the individual choice in collective decision milieu;
individuals must not only rank the alternatives constructively but they may
pick the most suitable ranking among others.
We consider a standard social choice framework where there are certain
number of individuals, a certain set of alternatives some to be chosen among
(or ranked) and certain types of preferences to be submitted. An aggregation
procedure is used to reach a best social outcome for this setting (preference
profile). Furthermore, diverging from standard fashion, we expose a certain
way of extending the preferences submitted to a higher level, to what we
call hyper-preferences, which are the rankings of rankings, reflecting one’s
preferences over orderings, extracted out of his choice among orderings. In
a social choice context, this can be seen as having preferences over ”social
rankings”. For instance, think of a society confronted with an alternatives
set and to decide on a socially best ranking of alternatives. This is a standard
framework where we have a profile of preferences and a social welfare func-
tion. Furthermore, as we assumed, this society is also attached to a hyper
profile where each of its members submit a preference over social rankings.
Since the aggregation procedure is already agreed on, we shall be concerned
with the outcome of this new social choice setting and in deed, as surely
engrossing, with the relation between the outcomes of each settings. In this
paper we condition social welfare functions to be stable (in differing ways),
in the sense that the outcomes of each settings should coincide.
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Having said these, as we only have a revealed choice among orderings
informationally, it’s obvious that we shall have a proper way of gathering the
information we look for, a hyper-preference, from what we have, a first-order
preference. This also leads to a plethora of directions so that we narrow our
aspect by restricting ourselves to one specific way of extending preferences
to higher levels, which we induce from what is known in the literature as
Kemeny distance (9). By doing so, imposing the condition called Kemeny
stability, we prompt certain features over preferences which will be pointed
in following sections.
Axiomatic social choice literature is somehow mute to include such dimen-
sional structures of preference. However, a similar phenomenon, the notion
of ”meta-preference” has been discussed among philosophers and economists
from mid-70s and on. Although not directly related, for the sake of com-
pleteness, we’ll mention those discussions. The idea there, though the set-
ting depending on the writer, was to study that humans have higher levels
of volition when they confront preference (or choice) structures that surely
affects the actual attitudes. Putting aside the question of the name-father,
we can refer to Harry G. Frankfurt (1971) as the one who brought up the
issue of second-order volition (3).
Following Frankfurt, Jeffrey (8) and Sen (12; 14) were the most influen-
tial discussants of the subject as a broader philosophical issue. Jeffrey (1974)
surveyed ideas of higher order preferences in order to analyze the more com-
plex real-life observations, as an attempt to expand the theory of preference.
On the other hand Sen tried to conceptualize the subject where he attempts
to conjoin morality (or other-regarding) into theory of preference and hence-
forth propose better constructions for prevailing models so as to solve puzzles
such as Prisoners’ Dilemma.
According to Frankfurt (1971), it’s been understood that it’s a charac-
teristic -and more assertively, the must- of humans to have second order
desires, wants or volition and this may be distinctive of what is observed
in daily life experiences involving choices. He suggested that one without
higher-order volition is deprived of the human essence. Later, in 1982, we
see Albert O. Hirschman writing on the subject (6), this time conjoint with
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his theory of ”exit and voice” (5) for public actions. He touches the subject
and the literature up to some point in a way to support his approach of
”dynamic” preferences where he considers a meta-preference as what gives
roots to the changes in preferences when faced with disappointment. On the
other hand, as to our knowledge, Igersheim (7) is the closest contemporary
economist approach to the phenomena. In her work, the aim was to solve
Sen (11) and Gibbard’s (4) libertarian paradoxes via introducing the con-
cept of meta-preferences to the setting. Igersheim explicitly uses what we
call a hyper-preference and construct them as we do up to a point where she
does not impose any restriction on how to obtain meta-preferences although
referring to possibilities of devising a method which respects individual mo-
tivations and determines certain meta-ranking for each ranking.
Constructed upon what is discussed above, our study in this paper can
be seen in the line of the literature on choosing aggregation rules endoge-
nously if looked at with a consequentialist view, labeling aggregation rules
with outcomes. To give sense of the referred literature, Koray (10) imposes a
condition for social choice functions which requires a function to select itself
when it’s now functions to be selected depending on individual’s preferences
over alternatives. Furthermore Barbera and Jackson (1) weaken the same
condition and look for implications of restricted domains and obtains possi-
bility results whereas Koray (2000) ends up at an Arrovian impossibility.
In section 2 we introduce the base notions and the setting. In section 3
we analyze the scoring rules while it comes to Condorcet type of aggrega-
tion rules in section 4. We conclude after showing a sufficient condition for
Kemeny stability in section 5.
3
2 Basic Notions and Definitions
Let N be the set of individuals and A be the set of alternatives with car-
dinality m. The set of all linear orders over A is denoted by L(A) where
the set of all complete weak orders over A is denoted by R(A). An order
P ∈ L(A) is a linear extension of a weak order R ∈ R(A) if for any a, b ∈ A,
aPb ⇒ aRb. A profile RN is a collection of orders, or formally RN ∈ DN
where D ⊆ R(A). The set of all linear extensions of R ∈ R(A) is denoted by
∆(R). The set of all profiles of linear orders compatible with the profile of
weak orders RN is denoted by ∆(RN), or formally ∆(RN) = ×i∈N(∆(Ri)).
A profile of linear orders is an element of L(A)N .
A social welfare function α : L(A)N → R(A) is a mapping from profiles of
strict orders to weak orders. Given a social welfare function α, an α-induced
social choice correspondence fα : L(A)N → 2A is a mapping from profiles
of orders to subsets of A such that ∀PN ∈ L(A)N , ∀a ∈ A, a ∈ fα(PN) ⇔
aα(PN)b, ∀b ∈ A.
What follows is the definition of the Kemeny distance which is quite
central in our analysis.
Definition 2.1 The Kemeny distance between two strict orders R,Q ∈ L(A),
denoted by dK(R,Q) is the symmetric difference between R and Q; or for-
mally dK(R,Q) = |{(a, b) ∈ R : (a, b) /∈ Q}|.
Take any P ∈ L(A). The Kemeny hyper-preference of the preference P ,
denoted by εK(P ) ∈ R(L(A)), is a complete weak order over linear orders
over A constructed via the Kemeny distance as follows: (Q,R) ∈ εK(P ) or
QεK(P )R⇔ dK(P,Q)≤dK(P,R).
Definition 2.2 The Kemeny hyper profile of the profile PN , denoted by
εK(PN), is the profile of Kemeny hyper-preferences of individuals with pref-
erences in PN , or formally, εK(PN) = {εK(Pi)}i∈N .
We are now ready to introduce the concept of Kemeny stability, with the
weakest version beforehand.
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Definition 2.3 A social welfare function α is weakly Kemeny stable if for
any PN ∈ L(A)N , there exists a P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)) such that ∆(α(PN)) ∩
fα(P ′N) *= ∅.
This condition is quite weak since it only requires that we should find
at least one linear extension of the Kemeny hyper profile which preserves a
compatible linear order of the initial societal preference as among the best.
Definition 2.4 A social welfare function α is Kemeny stable if for any PN ∈
L(A)N and for any P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)), ∆(α(PN)) ⊆ fα(P ′N).
Stability requires the social welfare function to preserve the social out-
come for the initial profile of preferences over alternatives as among bests
when we move to linear hyper-preferences. One may propose many different
types of stability. We also considered a number of them and a couple of them
and some results related can be found in the Appendix A.
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3 Scoring Rules
In this section we study the Kemeny stability of scoring rules. To begin
with visual examples we show instabilities of Borda, plurality and negative
plurality rules. Then we move on by analyzing the scoring rules in general.
We define a social welfare scoring function ς : L(A)N → R(A) for every
finite set of alternatives A with at least three alternatives as follows. Let
{Smς }m≥3 = {S3ς , S4ς , ...} be a sequence of scoring vectors, m being the number




ς , ..., s
m,m
ς ) ∈ Rm is such that;
(i) sm,mς = 0,
1
(ii) s1,mς ≥ s2,mς ≥ ... ≥ sm,mς and
(iii) s1,mς > s
m,m
ς .
Letting |A| = m, the ς score of the alternative x ∈ A in the profile PN




ς where ri(x, PN) is the rank of x in Pi. Then
ς, a scoring rule with the sequence {Smς }m≥3 = {S3ς , S4ς , ...} of scoring vec-
tors defined as above over the alternatives set A is such that ∀PN ∈ L(A)N ,
∀x, y ∈ A, xς(PN)y ⇐⇒ Smς (x, PN) ≥ Smς (y, PN).
3.1 Illustration
The Borda Rule
Definition 3.1 The Borda rule is the social welfare scoring function β de-
fined with a sequence {Smβ }m≥3 = {S3β, S4β, ...} of scoring vectors where Smβ =
(s1,mβ , s
2,m
β , ..., s
m,m
β ) ∈ Rm is such that sm,mβ = 0 and sk,mβ = sk+1,mβ + 1,
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m− 1}.
Consider the following profile PN ;
1The conditions (ii) and (iii) are basically enough to define a scoring rule, but we choose







The Borda result is a set ∆(β(PN)) = {cab, acb}. But if we consider the








where we see that β(cab, PN) = 21 > 19 = β(acb, PN) which leads to
exclusion of the ranking acb from the choice set of P ′N under β. Hence this
profile constitutes an example to see that the Borda rule fails stability.
The Plurality Rule
Definition 3.2 The plurality rule is the social welfare scoring function pi





pi , ..., s
m,m
pi ) ∈ Rm is such that sk,mpi = 0, ∀k > 1 and s1,mpi = 1.






The plurality social welfare function will end up at the ranking abc. How-
ever, it is easy to note that the plurality social choice rule will result in the
ranking acb for any Kemeny hyper profile.
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The Inverse Plurality Rule
Definition 3.3 The inverse plurality rule is the social welfare scoring func-
tion pi′ defined with a sequence {Smpi′}m≥3 = {S3pi′ , S4pi′ , ...} of scoring vectors




pi′ , ..., s
m,m
pi′ ) ∈ Rm is such that sk,mpi′ = 1, ∀k > 1 and
s1,mpi′ = 0.
Consider the following profile PN ;
3 3 2 3 4
a b a c c
b a c a b
c c b b a
which results abc as the unique linear inverse plural social preference. But
observe the Kemeny hyper profile of this profile below;
3 2 3 3 4
abc acb bac cab cba
acb, bac abc, cab abc, bca cba, acb cab, bca
bca, cab cba, bac acb, cba abc, bca bac, acb
cba bca cab bac abc
which shows that abc should be defeated by others in any linear extension
of this profile, under inverse plurality rule. Hence the inverse plurality rule
also fails Kemeny stability.
3.2 Scoring Rules in General
We narrow down the question of stability to three-alternative case, since
if there exists no three dimensional vector which qualifies to belong to the
sequence {Smς }m≥3 and yet define a scoring rule which satisfies stability, then
there cannot be defined a scoring rule which is stable2.
Theorem 3.1 There exists no Kemeny stable scoring rule.
2It is also to be noted that scoring rules fail any type of stability we explored, which
are added in the appendix.
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In the proof of the theorem, we prove the impossibility of a scoring vector
for three alternatives to be stable. To do so, we juxtapose a series of lemmata,
useful to follow. Since it is of a special interest, we prove here the first of the
lemmata, which shows that general plurality rules fail stability.
Lemma 3.1 There exists no scoring rule ς with S3ς = (s
1,m
ς , 0, 0) which is
Kemeny stable.
Proof. Consider the following profile QN with three alternatives a, b and c
where there are n1 + n2 + n3 individuals with shown preferences over these














n3s1,mς which gives ς(QN) = abc. Observing the linear Kemeny hyper profile








we see that ς(QN) is Pareto-dominated by cab in Q′N , which implies that
ς(QN) /∈ fς(Q′N) hence shows the failure to satisfy any type of stability.
The rest of the proof of the Theorem 3.1 is in the Appendix B. We now
turn to Condorcet type rules.
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4 Condorcet Social Welfare Functions
In this section we explore the Kemeny stability of the Condorcet type social
welfare functions. For the sake of precision we first introduce the refinements
for our purposes regarding some prevailing definitions and notions.
Let µ(PN) denote the majority tournament for PN where aµ(PN)b iff |{i ∈
N : aPib}| ≥ {i ∈ N : bPia}|. When S ⊆ A, the Condorcet winner of S ac-
cording to the profile PN , CW (PN |S) ∈ S is such that CW (PN |S)µ(PN)a, ∀a ∈
S and we abbreviate CW (PN |A) as CW (PN) and note that it is either a sin-
gleton or empty.
A subset S ⊆ A is called a majority cycle for the profile PN if S can be
written as S = {s1, s2, ..., s#S} where siµ(PN)si+1, ∀i ∈ N#S−1 and s#Sµ(PN)s1.
The top-cycle of the subset S for the profile PN , T (S, PN), is a majority cy-
cle such that aµ(PN)b, ∀a ∈ T (S, PN) and ∀b ∈ S\T (S, PN). Now let A1 =
T (A,PN) and recursively define Ai = T (A\
i−1∪
j=1
Aj, PN), ∀i ≥ 2. Hence for
any profile of preferences PN over any finite set of alternatives A, we have
a unique ordered partition (A1, A2, ..., AK), called majoritarian partition, of
nonempty subsets of A, where i < j =⇒ aµ(PN)b for all a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Aj.
Note that when Ai is a singleton, it is the Condorcet winner among the rest,




Definition 4.1 Let PN be a profile of linear preferences over A and (A1, A2, ..., AK)
be the corresponding majoritarian partition. A social welfare function α is
said to be Condorcet type if ∀PN ∈ L(A)N it is the case that xα(PN)y, ∀x, y ∈ Ai
and i < j =⇒ xα∗(PN)y, ∀x ∈ Ai and ∀y ∈ Aj.
In the case where the majority tournament is a linear order for the initial
profile over alternatives, as the following proposition shows the Condorcet
winner, if exists, of any (linear) hyper profile will coincide with it.
Proposition 4.1 Let PN be a profile of preferences over a finite set of al-
ternatives A such that µ(PN) ∈ L(A). Then for any P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)), it is
true that CW (P ′N) ∈ {∅, µ(PN)}.
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Proof. Let A = {a1, ..., am} and PN be a profile over A such that µ(PN) =
a1a2...am. Let Q = b1b2...bm be the Condorcet winner for P ′N , a (linear) hyper
profile of PN , and suppose for a contradiction that b1 *= a1 = bh for some
h ∈ {2, ...,m}. Now define Q′ = b1...bh−2bhbh−1bh+1...bm and observe that
dK(Pi, Q) = dK(Pi, Q′) + 1 for all i ∈ N with bhPibh−1. Since a majority of
voters rank bh over bh−1, we have that Q′µ(εK(PN))Q, which is the desired
contradiction since it also applies to any linearization of εK(PN) and the
iteration of the argument ensures Q = µ(PN).
Perhaps not surprisingly, we discover a positive result for the sake of
Kemeny stability when we anatomize the Condorcet social welfare functions.
In fact, we introduce one example of the mentioned. But before that, it would
be preparatory to show stability features of some well-known Condorcet type
solution concepts.
To start with, Copeland solution is shown to fail Kemeny stability.
Definition 4.2 Copeland solution, κ, is defined as xκ(PN)y ⇐⇒ c(x, PN) ≥
c(y, PN) where c(a, PN) = |z ∈ A : aµ(PN)z|−| z ∈ A : zµ(PN)a|.
Consider the following profile PN ;
PN =
1 1 1 1 1
a a b b c
b c c a a
c b a c b
where we have ∆(κ(PN)) = {abc} since abc is the linear pairwise majority
solution. Now consider the linear hyper profile P ′N ;
P ′N =
1 1 1 1 1
abc acb bca bac cab
acb cab bac bca acb
bac abc cba abc cba
cab cba cab acb bca
bca bac abc cba abc
cba bca acb cab bac
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where κ(PN) = abc defeats bac, acb, cba in µ(P ′N) while another order, acb
is defeating more, namely cab, bca, bac, cba. This shows the instability. Let
us now turn to another solution concept, the Slater solution.
Definition 4.3 Slater solution for a profile PN ∈ L(A)N is a subset SL(PN)
of L(A) such that P ∈ SL(PN) ⇐⇒ dK(P, µ(PN)) ≤ dK(R, µ(PN)), ∀R ∈ L(A).
Consider the following profile of preferences PN , where A is a set of 8
alternatives;
PN =
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
b a d c d
c b a a b
d c b d c
a d c b a
a′ b′ d′ d′ c′
b′ c′ a′ b′ a′
c′ d′ b′ c′ d′
d′ a′ c′ a′ b′
.
Now if we partition A such as X = {a, b, c, d} and Y = {a′, b′, c′, d′}
and consider the restrictions of the profile to these partitions, PN |X and
PN |Y , they will be similar in the sense that the alternatives denoted with
and without primes would be treated in same way in the profiles. This





whilst all alternatives in X beat all in Y . The Slater solution to the tour-
nament is SL(µ(PN)|X) = {cdab} which implies also that SL(µ(PN)|Y ) =
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{c′d′a′b′}, hence SL(PN) = {cdabc′d′a′b′}. Now let Q = dbcad′b′c′a′ and ob-
serve the Kemeny distances between Pi and SL(PN) and between Pi and
Q;
Pi SL(PN) Q
P1 3 + 4 2 + 5
P2 4 + 3 5 + 2
P3 3 + 3 2 + 2
P4 1 + 3 4 + 0
P5 3 + 1 0 + 4
.
It follows that in the Kemeny hyper profile, Q is strictly preferred to
SL(PN) by individual 3. Now it is to note that this implies the existence of
a linear extension where Q Pareto dominates SL(PN). Since Slater solution
is in the Pareto set, this observation concludes that Slater rule fails Kemeny
stability.
4.1 Condorcet Rules in General
Towards the Kemeny stability characteristics of Condorcet social welfare
functions we expose and prove a proposition. To do this, we need to introduce
the following setting. Let Q ∈ L(A). We write Q = (Q1 → Q2 → ...→ Qh)
for some h ∈ N and Qi ∈ L(Si) where ∅ *= Si ⊆ A and {S1, S2, ..., Sh}
partitions A. We call Qi a segment of Q. Note that Sis are allowed to be
singletons.
Proposition 4.2 Let PN be a profile of linear orders over A, where |A| = m.
Let Q,Q′ ∈ L(A) be such that Q = (Q1 → a → Q2 → b → Q3) and
Q′ = (Q1 → b → Q2 → a → Q3) for some segments Q1, Q2 and Q3 and
singletons a,b. Then, for any individual i ∈ N , aPib =⇒ Qε∗K(Pi)Q′.
Proof. First note that the Kemeny distance only considers symmetric dif-
ferences. Hence we can restrict our attention to Q2, a and b. Consider an
individual i ∈ N with aPib and the restriction Pi|S2∪{a,b} = Pi, where we have
dK(Pi, Q|S2∪{a,b}) = dK(Pi, Q) and dK(Pi, Q′|S2∪{a,b}) = dK(Pi, Q′).
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Let the upper contour of y in S2 for Pi be Uy = {x ∈ S2 : xPiy}. Hence
we have Ua ⊆ Ub. We can write Pi = (V → a→ V ′ → b→ V ′′) for some V ∈
L(Ua ∩ Ub), V ′ ∈ L(Ub − (Ua ∪ {a})) and V ′′ ∈ L(S2 − (Ua ∪ Ub ∪ {a, b})).
Now let us call |Ua ∩ Ub| = '1, |Ub − (Ua ∪ {a})| = '2 and |S2 − (Ua ∪ Ub ∪
{a, b})| = '3. It follows that dK(Pi, Q′) − dK(Pi, Q) = '1 + 2'2 + '3 + '4 +
1 − ('1 + '3 + '4) = 2'2 + 1, where '4 = dK(Pi|A−S−{a,b}, Q|A−S−{a,b}). Since
'2 ≥ 0, we have that dK(Pi, Q′) > dK(Pi, Q) which implies Qε∗K(Pi)Q′.
An immediate corollary is the following.
Corollary 4.1 Let PN be a profile of linear orders over A. Let Q,Q′ ∈ L(A)
be such that Q = (Q1 → a → Q2 → b → Q3) and Q′ = (Q1 → b →
Q2 → a→ Q3) for some segments Q1, Q2 and Q3 and singletons a,b. Then
aµ(PN)b =⇒ Qµ(εK(PN))Q′ and hence Qµ(P ′N)Q′, ∀P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)).
As mentioned before, the existence of a Condorcet social welfare function
satisfying Kemeny stability will be shown by introducing a special social
welfare function. But before that, we will prove that another Condorcet
social welfare function, θ as defined in following, satisfies Kemeny stability of
type 3 3. This will make easy to spectate the discussion when the existence of a
Condorcet type social welfare function which is Kemeny stable is established.
Definition 4.4 Let PN be a profile of linear orders over A and (A1, A2, ..., AK)
be the corresponding majoritarian partition. The social welfare function θ is
such that ∀i, j ≤ K, aθ(PN)b and ¬{bθ(PN)a} ∀a ∈ Ai, ∀b ∈ Aj when i < j
while aθ(PN)b and bθ(PN)a ∀a, b ∈ Ai.
The social welfare function θ basically takes ordered majoritarian parti-
tion into account such that it considers the alternatives in the same cycle as
indifferent while respecting the strict order between cycles. In what follows,
it is proven after Lemma 4.1 that the social welfare function θ turns out to
be Kemeny stable of type 3.
3See Appendix A for types of stability.
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Lemma 4.1 Given a profile PN over A, let Q = (S1 → S2 → ... → Sk →
...→ SK), where for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, Sk = ak1ak2...akHk is a Hamiltonian path 4 of
Ak. Then Q ∈ T (L(A), εK(PN)).
Proof. The proof is done by induction over the number of alternatives.
Induction Basis: m=3
Let PN be a preference profile over A = {a, b, c}. Without loss of gen-
erality we either have µ(PN) = {abc} or a cycle, µ(PN) = abca. Thanks to the
Proposition 4.1, we have abcµ(εK(PN))bac, abcµ(εK(PN))acb and abcµ(εK(PN))cba.
Besides bacµ(εK(PN))cab and acbµ(εK(PN))bca we also have;
(i) if µ(PN) = abc, then cabµ(εK(PN))cba;
(ii) if µ(PN) *= abc, then bcaµ(εK(PN))cba.
We see that abc defeats either directly or indirectly every other order in
εK(PN), so any Hamiltonian path in the cycle abca is in T (L(A), εK(PN)).
Inductive Assumption: let the result hold for m-1
For any number of alternatives, Qµ(εK(PN))(a11 → S) if and only if
Q|A−{a11} µ(εK(PN |A−{a11}))S where S ∈ L(A− {a11}). Then, by the inductive
hypothesis, Q indirectly defeats all orders of A in εK(PN) having the form
(a11 → S) where |A| = m.
Now take any akh *= a11, and let Q−hk = Q|A−{akh} = (a11...akh−1akh+1...aKHK ).
By the induction hypothesis, we observe that Q−hk defeats any other order of
(A− {akh}) in εK(PN |A−{akh}). Hence one get that (akh → Q−hk) indirectly de-
feats in εK(PN) any order of the form (akh → Z) whereQ−hk *= Z ∈ L(A− {akh}).
Suppose that a11µ(PN)a
k
h. By Proposition 4.1, we have thatQµ(εK(PN))(a
h
k →
Q−hk) so that Q indirectly defeats all orders of A in εK(PN) having the form
(akh → S).




h *= a12 and either akh−1µ(PN)akh (if
h > 1) or ak−1Hk−1µ(PN)a
k
h (if h = 1). Suppose that h > 1. By Proposition 4.1,
Qµ(εK(PN))(akh−1 → Q−(h−1)k)µ(εK(PN))(akh → Q−hk). Since (akh → Q−hk)
4A Hamiltonian path visits each element exactly once.
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indirectly defeats in µ(εK(PN)) any order of the form (akh → Z), then Q
defeats in µ(εK(PN)) any order of the form (akh → S), or formally Q ∈
T (L(A), εK(PN)).
Theorem 4.1 The social welfare function θ is Kemeny stable of type 3.
Proof. It suffices to show that Q = (S1 → S2 → ... → Sk → ... → SK)
as defined earlier, is in fθ(εK(PN)), where for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, Sk = ak1ak2...akHk
is a Hamiltonian path of Ak of majoritarian partition for PN , because Q is
among the compatible linear orders with θ(PN) already. But θ is defined so
that aθ(PN)b and ¬{bθ(PN)a} ∀a ∈ Ai, ∀b ∈ Aj when i < j while aθ(PN)b
and bθ(PN)a ∀a, b ∈ Ai, ∀i, j ≤ k; which means that for all profiles, anything
in the top-cycle is put in the top indifference class of θ. Hence ∀P ∈ L(A),
P ∈ T (L(A), εK(PN)) =⇒ Pθ(εK(PN))Z, ∀Z ∈ L(A) and we also know
that Q ∈ ∆(θ(PN)) =⇒ Q ∈ T (L(A), εK(PN)) which completes the proof.
Now let us introduce a social welfare correspondence, θ¯, which is shown
to be Kemeny stable (of type 1) and through which we show existence of a
Kemeny stable Condorcet social welfare function.
Definition 4.5 Let PN be a profile of linear orders over A and (A1, A2, ..., AK)
be the corresponding majoritarian partition. The social welfare correspon-
dence θ¯ is such that p ∈ θ¯(PN) ⇐⇒ p = (H1 → H2 → ...→ Hk → ...→ HK)





is a Hamiltonian path in Ak.
An immediate corollary to Theorem 4.2 is the following.
Corollary 4.2 The social welfare correspondence θ¯ is Kemeny stable of type
3.
Furthermore as we mentioned before, θ¯ is Kemeny stable of type 1 in
deed.
Theorem 4.2 The social welfare correspondence θ¯ is Kemeny stable.
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Proof. We know that Q, defined as in Lemma 4.1, is in T (L(A), εK(PN))
and it, by definition of θ¯, is in θ¯(PN). Now we have to show that there
exists a Hamiltonian path P = p1p2...pL in T (L(A), εK(PN)) for some L =
|T (L(A), εK(PN))| ∈ N such that p1 = Q. But this is obvious to see because
for any profile piN ∈ L(A)N , ∀x ∈ (T (piN)) there exists a Hamiltonian path
in top-cycle that starts with x.
It is a corollary to this theorem that there exists a Condorcet type social
welfare function which is Kemeny stable since it’s always possible to define
a singleton-valued selection of θ¯ which is Kemeny stable.
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5 Concluding Remarks
So far we discussed two main path of social welfare correspondences; scoring
rules and Condorcet type rules. We now show a sufficient condition for
Kemeny stability and then conclude.
5.1 A sufficient condition
It’s useful to note the following remark which basically says that any lin-
earization of a Kemeny extension of a linear order preserves the Kemeny
distance in the sense that if Q is strictly closer to P than R, then any lin-
earization of Kemeny extension of P also ranks Q higher than R.
Remark 5.1 For all Q,R, P ∈ L(A), Qε∗K(P )R =⇒ QP ′R, ∀P ′ ∈ ∆(εK(P )).
At this point we visit another condition on social welfare functions, called
”strong neutrality” and show its sufficiency for Kemeny stability. The reader
is advised to be aware of the discussions Sen (13) puts forward on the overly
welfarist aspect of this kind of neutrality (or independence) conditions5.
Definition 5.1 Let N ∈ N represent a society and PN and QN be two profiles
of linear preferences over A and B respectively. A social welfare function f is
said to satisfy strong neutrality if whenever we have xPiy ⇐⇒ wQiz, ∀i ∈ N
for some x, y ∈ A and w, z ∈ B we have xf(PN)y ⇐⇒ wf(QN)z.
Definition 5.2 For all p ∈ L(A)N with akpal for some ak, al ∈ A, let p−kl
be the akal-swap of p and defined as p−kl = (Q1 → al → Q2 → ak → Q3)
where p = (Q1 → ak → Q2 → al → Q3).
Theorem 5.1 A social welfare function is strongly neutral only if it is Ke-
meny stable.
Proof. Let for all finite X, α : L(X)N → R(X) be a strongly neutral
social welfare function and let p = (a1a2...am) ∈ ∆(α(PN)) where A =
5And we are also aware of the ”strictness” of the condition although it’s included in
this study as an example of a sufficiency condition.
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{a1, a2, ..., am}. Then, aiα(PN)aj, for all ai, aj ∈ A with i < j ≤ m. Now take
k, l ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such that akα(PN)al. We can partition N with Nkl and
Nlk such that Nkl = {i ∈ N : akPial} and Nlk = {i ∈ N : alPiak} for some
k, l ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}. This constitutes a partition of N because PN ∈ L(A)N .
We know from the Proposition 4.2 that ∀i ∈ N aPib =⇒ pε∗K(Pi)p−ab for
every p in L(A) such that apb. Due to the Remark 5.1, if we suppose akpal,

















Now since akα(PN)al, we have by strong neutrality that pα(P ′N)p
−kl for
all linearization P ′N of εK(PN). Whence p ∈ ∆(α(PN)) implies that p beats
p−ij in εK(PN) for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} which exhausts the set of all linear
orders over A.
An immediate corollary follows if we weaken the condition of neutrality
as ”a social welfare function f is said to satisfy strong neutrality if whenever
we have xPiy ⇐⇒ wQiz, ∀i ∈ N for some x, y ∈ A and w, z ∈ B we have
xf ∗(PN)y =⇒ wf(QN)z”.
Corollary 5.1 A social welfare function satisfies neutrality only if it is Ke-
meny stable of type 3.
5.2 Conclusion
We introduced a new notion of stability for social aggregation rules. This
new notion, ”Kemeny stability”, requires an aggregation rule to preserve
the socially best ranking among the best rankings when it is applied to
the hyper-preference profile. By a hyper-preference we mean a ranking of
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rankings of alternatives which is extracted from an individual’s preferences
over alternatives via the use of Kemeny distance. The condition could be
exposed in different ways and we considered a couple of them.
We began by analyzing the Kemeny stability of scoring rules. It turned
out that there exists no scoring rule which satisfies our requirement. While
showing this, we particularly looked at some specific examples of scoring
rules. Furthermore, we looked at Condorcet type social welfare functions.
Consequently we showed that although not trivially, there may be found
Condorcet type social welfare functions which are Kemeny stable. Finally
we have shown a sufficient condition to satisfy the requirement.
One of the major things to note is that the use of the Kemeny distance
is essential in our analysis. It is done so not only due to the reputation
of Kemeny’s distance in social choice literature but is also justified by the
idea of hyper-preferences and our approach to the phenomena. The hyper-
preference of an individual, in our context, represents his preferences over
social outcomes and -as doing so is quite natural in such abstractions- indi-
viduals are assumed to be selfish. This only points to the fact that under
Kemeny distance the best ranking for an individual who ranked alternatives
as in p, is p itself. The further structure of Kemeny hyper-preferences is less
debatable since it rests on the idea that if the ’same’ is the best then the
’reverse’ is the worst and going from the best to the worst in terms of alter-
ation, one loses utility. We close this note by adding that however natural it
appears to rest on Kemeny distance in constructing hyper-preferences, it is
an open area of interesting research to look for alternative approaches.
Two more things which are dual; one is related to the way we look for
stability (from the extension to rules or vice versa) and the other is the
interpretations of the stabilities (different types of stability and restrictions
over domains of hyper preferences; neutral etc.). For the former, it reveals
itself from the (in)stability of scoring rules. We showed that there does not
exists a stable scoring rule, if we stick to Kemeny distance. However, it is
of interest to find out, for example, an ’extension’ rule for which the Borda
rule is stable when same methods used. This applies of course not only to
scoring rules, but to any aggregation rule. For the latter we can example
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neutrality restriction over the domain of hyper-preferences as we considered
in the Appendix B. It may be of interest to look for significant restrictions.
Last but not least, the characterization of Kemeny stable (of any type)
social welfare functions is still an open question. Among others we conjecture
that the weakest stability condition we consider together with quasi indepen-
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A Appendix: Types of Stability
In this appendix, we introduce different types of stability interpretations we
consider. These are called type 1, type 2, neutral and weak stabilities. We
show the interrelations of different types and put out some results related.
Definition A.1 A social welfare function α is Kemeny stable (of type 1) if
for any PN ∈ L(A)N and for any P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)), ∆(α(PN)) ⊆ fα(P ′N).
Having a profile of linear orders and a social welfare function, we induce
a weak social preference. If we extend this profile via Kemeny distance, we
obtain a new profile of preferences over linear orders. This profile consists of
weak preferences of course. Generally, there may be many linear order profiles
compatible with this weak preference profile. Type 1 stability requires the
social welfare function to preserve the social outcome for the initial profile
of preferences over alternatives among bests when we move to linear hyper-
preferences.
Definition A.2 A social welfare function α is Kemeny stable of type 2 if
for any PN ∈ L(A)N and for any P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)), fα(P ′N) ⊆ ∆(α(PN)).
Type 2 stability requires that if we want to apply the same social welfare
function to all of these linearized profiles we should always observe orders
compatible with the social preference induced from the initial profile over
alternatives. Note that type 2 is even more demanding than type 1 when
∆(α(.)) is singleton-valued for the initial profile. In deed, type 2 restricts
the possible social outcomes set while type 1 only requires not to exclude the
initial social outcomes.
Definition A.3 A social welfare function α is Kemeny stable of type 3 if for
any PN ∈ L(A)N and for any P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)), ∆(α(PN)) ∩ fα(P ′N) *= ∅.
Instead of preserving all (if many) initial social outcomes as in the case
of type 1 and type 2, the third type requires only that at least one would be
satisfied by the social welfare function in the hyper-preference setting. When
∆(α(PN)) is singleton-valued, of course, type 3 coincides with type 1.
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One may also think of a regularity in extending the preferences. To give
insight, one may propose that individuals having the same initial prefer-
ences over alternatives should also share the extended preference or more
demandingly that the extension should be somehow neutrally done among
individuals. The latter can be integrated in our puzzle as what follows.
Definition A.4 A linear extension P ′N of a Kemeny hyper profile εK(PN)
is said to be a neutral linear extension profile if any pair of preferences in
P ′N is isomorphic in the sense that for each Pi, Pj ∈ PN there exists a per-
mutation σij : A → A such that σij(R)εK(Pi)σij(Q) ⇔ RεK(Pj)Q, ∀R,Q ∈
L(A) where ∀T ∈ L(A), σij(T ) is the linear order such that aσij(T )b ⇔
σij(a)Tσij(b).
The neutral linear extensions subset of all linear extensions is denoted by
∆ν(εK(PN)). To clarify things, consider the following example. We have the




Now we also have the corresponding Kemeny hyper profile along with a
numerical representation;
abc acb bac (123)
acb, bac abc, cab bca, abc (132), (213)
bca, cab cba, bac acb, cba (231), (312)
cba bca cab (321)
.
Then the following two linear extensions of the hyper profiles are the two
















So if we restrict our attention on stability to only such linearization, we
have the following property.
Definition A.5 A social welfare function α is neutral Kemeny stable if for
any PN ∈ L(A)N , P ′N ∈ ∆ν(εK(PN)) ⇒ α(PN) ⊆ fα(P ′N).
Furthermore we may propose the following weakening.
Definition A.6 A social welfare function α is weakly Kemeny stable if for
any PN ∈ L(A)N , there exists a linear hyper profile P ′N ∈ ∆(εK(PN)) such
that ∆(α(PN)) ∩ fα(P ′N) *= ∅.
This condition is quite weak since it only requires that we should find at
least one linear extension of the Kemeny hyper profile which preserves one
initial societal preference as among the best.
The following remarks are devoted to relationships between different types
of stability.
Remark A.1
(a) If ∆(α(PN)) is singleton valued for all PN ∈ L(A), or in other words,
if α(PN) ∈ L(A), ∀PN ∈ L(A)N then;
type 1⇐⇒ type 2⇐⇒ type 3 =⇒ neutral =⇒ weak.
(b) If otherwise, the relationships are as follows;
(i) type 1 =⇒ type 3 =⇒ weak;
(ii) type 2 =⇒ type 3;
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(iii) type 1 =⇒ neutral =⇒ weak.
As an example, let’s pick the Borda rule and look at stability character-
istics of it. As we show next, the Borda rule happens to be weakly stable
when the number of alternatives is three, although it is not neutrally stable.
Proposition A.1 When |A| = 3 the Borda rule is weakly Kemeny stable.
Proof. Consider the following generic profile PN ;
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
a a b b c c
b c a c a b
c b c a b a
.
The resulting Borda scores for each alternative are;
β(a) = 2(n1 + n2) + n3 + n5,
β(b) = 2(n3 + n4) + n1 + n6,
β(c) = 2(n5 + n6) + n2 + n4.
Now let us assume β(a) ≥ β(b) ≥ β(c) without loss of generality. Hence
the resulting Borda outcome is such that abc ∈ ∆(β(PN)). We will prove
that for any combination of nis such that i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6} and ni ∈ N there
exists an extension of the Kemeny hyper profile to a compatible hyper profile
of linear orders on linear orders, such that the Borda outcome of this linear
hyper profile puts the ranking abc at the top. To show this, let us consider
the case where we put the ranking abc only upper where we needed to replace
it to obtain a linear extension. Hence we can count the maximum possible
Borda score of the ranking abc it can take in an extended profile. Then we
will compare this score with the minimum possible (and compatible with
the maximum possible Borda score of the ranking abc) scores of each other
rankings and show that these minimum scores of other rankings cannot beat
the score of abc.
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Observe the followings, implied by our assumption that abc ∈ ∆(β(Pn));
β(a) ≥ β(b)
2(n1 + n2) + n3 + n5 ≥ 2(n3 + n4) + n1 + n6
n1 + 2n2 + n5 ≥ n3 + 2n4 + n6
Similarly,
β(b) ≥ β(c)
2n3 + n4 + n1 ≥ n6 + 2n5 + n2
and
β(a) ≥ β(c)
2n1 + n2 + n3 ≥ n5 + 2n6 + n6
Observe the following Kemeny hyper profile for PN .
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
abc acb bac bca cab cba
acb, bac abc, cab abc, bca bac, cba cba, acb cab, bca
bca, cab cba, bac acb, cba abc, cab abc, bca bac, acb
cba bca cab acb bac abc
The table below shows the situation where abc is only put upper in the
linear extensions. The empty spots with ”-” are not determined and are to
be filled with one of the rankings from the indifference class below them.
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 β
abc acb bac bca cab cba 5
− abc abc − − − 4
acb, bac cab bca bac, cba cba, acb cab, bca 3
− − − abc abc bac, acb 2
bca, cab cba, bac acb, cba cab bca − 1
cba bca cab acb bac abc 0
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Now it is easy to calculate the maximum score abc gets;
β+(abc) = 5n1 + 4(n2 + n3) + 2(n4 + n5).
And here are the minimum scores of all other rankings;
β−(acb) = 3n1 + 5n2 + n3 + 3n5 + n6
β−(bac) = 5n1 + n2 + 5n3 + 3n4 + n6
β−(bca) = n1 + 3n3 + 5n4 + n5 + 3n6
β−(cab) = n1 + 3n2 + n4 + 5n5 + 3n6
β−(cba) = n2 + n3 + 3n4 + 3n5 + 5n6
Case 1
Suppose acb is not beaten by abc in any extension. Then also for the
extension where abc gets its maximum score and acb gets its minimum score,
acb is not beaten by abc. This requires that β−(acb) > β+(abc).Which means
that 3n1+5n2+n3+3n5+n6 > 5n1+4(n2+n3)+2(n4+n5), or equivalently
n2 + 2n5 + n6 > 2n1 + 3n3 + 2n4. But adding (n1 + n3 + n4) to both sides of
the inequality β(b) > β(c) we obtain 2n1 + 3n3 + 2n4 > (n2 + 2n5 + n6) +
(n1 + n3 + n4) which is a contradiction. The other cases to check are left to
the reader.
Proposition A.2 The Borda rule is not neutral Kemeny stable.








The Borda result is such that ∆(β(PN)) = {abc, bac}. However, consid-
ering the neutral extension
1 1 3 β
abc(123) acb(123) bac(123) 5
acb(132) abc(132) bca(132) 4
bac(213) cab(213) abc(213) 3
cab(312) bac(312) cba(312) 2
bca(231) cba(231) acb(231) 1
cba(321) bca(321) cab(321) 0
we see that β(bac) = 20 > 18 = β(abc), hence prove that Borda rule
is not neutral Kemeny stable since abc, a Borda result of initial profile is
excluded in the Borda bests of a neutral Kemeny hyper profile.
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B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.4
As Lemma 3.5 shows, we are left only with the scoring rules which have
either s1,3 = s2,3 > s3,3 or s1,3 > s2,3 > s3,3. The former is a sort of negative
plurality rule which is already shown to fail stability.
The lemmas are introduced so that once the last one is established, they
will constitute an incompatibility with the definition of a scoring vector.








Proof. Consider the following profile PN and suppose (i) s1,3ς > 2s
2,3
ς ;
1 1 1 1
a a b c
b c c b
c a a a










ς (c, PN), we have
ς(PN) = {abc, acb}. Consider the following two hyper profiles;
P ′N =
1 1 1 1
abc acb bca cba
bac cab cba bca
acb abc bac cab
bca cba cab bac
cab bac abc acb
cba bca acb abc
P ′′N =
1 1 1 1
abc acb bca cba
acb abc bac cab
bac cab cba bca
cab bac abc acb
bca cba cab bac
























































where {ς(P ′N), ς(P ′′N)} ⊇ {abc, acb}. Hence s1,6ς + s3,6ς + s5,6ς ≥ s1,6ς + s2,6ς + s4,6ς




ς ≤ s1,6ς + s2,6ς + s4,6ς by stability imply that s3,6ς + s5,6ς =
s2,6ς + s
4,6
ς . Equivalently and by the definition of a scoring vector, we have
0 ≥ s3,6ς − s2,6ς = s4,6ς − s5,6ς ≥ 0. So we have s2,6ς = s3,6ς and s4,6ς = s5,6ς .
The case (ii) that s1,3ς > 2s
2,3
ς will lead similar argument for the same
profiles; the check is left to reader. Now let us turn to the case (iii) where
s1,3ς = 2s
2,3





where we have ς(QN) = {bca}, since S3ς (a,QN) = 4s2,3ς , S3ς (b, QN) = 6s2,3ς
and S3ς (c,QN) = 5s
2,3
ς . Observe that for any Q
′ ∈ ∆(εK(QN)) we have
2s2,6ς + 2s
4,6




ς ≥ S6ς (cba,Q′N) ≥ 2s1,6ς + 3s5,6ς .
And stability requires 2s3,6ς + 2s
5,6
ς ≥ 2s1,6ς + 3s5,6ς , which implies 0 ≥ 2s3,6ς − 2s1,6ς ≥
3s4,6ς − 2s5,6ς ≥ 0. But then 3s4,6ς = 2s5,6ς implies that s4,6ς = s5,6ς = 0 which in
turn implies by definition of a scoring vector and S6ς (bca,Q
′
N) ≥ S6ς (cba,Q′N)




ς also in deed).
Lemma 2 basically shows that to satisfy stability a scoring rule should
ignore how a tie is broken in the Kemeny hyper profile.









Proof. Consider the following profile QN ;
n m n n
a a b c
b c a b
c a c a
We have the following scores for the alternatives;















Now let B < ( sς
2,3
sς1,3
)A. Then we have S3ς (b) > S
3
ς (a) > S
3
ς (c) hence
∆(ς(Q)) = {bac}. The stability of ς requires that S6ς (bac,Q′N) ≥ S6ς (abc,Q′N)
for each profile Q′N of linear hyper-preferences. Consider the following linear
hyper profile, Q′N ;
Q′N =
n m n n
abc acb bac cba
bac abc abc cab
acb cab bca bca
bca cba cba acb
cab bac acb bac
cba bca cab abc
where we need 2ns1,6ς +(n+m)s
5,6
ς ≥ (2n+m)s1,6ς ⇔ s1,6ς ≤ (n+mm )s5,6ς for
S6ς (bac,Q
′
N) ≥ S6ς (abc,Q′N) by the use of Lemma B.3. Since we have s1,6ς > 0
it follows that s5,6ς > 0.






Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that 3s2,3ς < 2s
1,3
ς and consider the profile
PN below:
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2 1 1 1
a a c b
b c b c
c b a a
We have that
S3ς (a, PN) = 3s
1,3
ς










which implies that ∆(ς(PN)) = {abc}. From Lemma B.2 and the assump-









by Lemma B.3 that s5,6ς > s
6,6
ς = 0. It is easy to check that for a linear hy-




N) ≥ S6ς (acb, P ′N)⇒3s1,6ς + s5,6ς ≥ 3s1,6ς + 2s5,6ς which
contradicts with the Lemma B.3.
Now suppose for a contradiction this time that 3s2,3ς > 2s
1,3
ς and consider





where we have that;





S3ς (b, QN) = 3s
2,3
ς
S3ς (c,QN) = 2s
1,3
ς
which implies ∆(ς(QN)) = {abc}. Now it is to observe that for a linear




N) ≥ S6ς (acb,Q′N) =⇒ 2s1,6ς + s5,6ς ≥ 2s1,6ς + 2s5,6ς
which contradicts with the Lemma B.2. Hence we are left with 3s2,3ς = 2s
1,3
ς
which ends the proof.




Lemma B.4 Let ς be Kemeny stable. Then we have s1,6ς > s
2,6
ς .
Proof. Suppose otherwise, or that s1,6ς = s
2,6
















But observe the profile PN ;
2 1 1 1
a b c c
b a b a
c c a b
where for any stable rule ς, we have












ς (c, PN) = 2s
1,3
ς .
Hence ∆(ς(PN)) = {abc}. But it’s quick to observe that for a linear hyper




N) ≥ S6ς (bac, P ′N)⇒3s1,6ς + s5,6ς ≥ 3s1,6ς + 2s5,6ς
which is the contradiction we desired, since Lemma B.2 showed that s5,6ς > 0.




ς ≥ s4,6ς = s5,6ς > s6,6ς = 0 necessarily for
Kemeny stability.
Lemma B.5 Let ς be Kemeny stable and that we have s1,3ς ≥ s2,3ς > 0. Then





Proof. Consider the profile PN ;
2 2 1 1
a a c b
b c b c
c b a a
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where we have;
S3ς (a, PN) = 4s
1,3
ς




























B.1. So it’s required that s1,6ς ≥ s2,6ς + s5,6ς .






S3ς (a,QN) = 3s
1,3
ς





S3ς (c,QN) = 3s
2,3
ς .
If (i) s1,3ς > 2s
2,3

















ς . So it’s required
that s1,6ς ≤ s2,6ς + s5,6ς .
If (ii) s1,3ς > 2s
2,3
ς , consider the following profile TN ;
1 1 1 2
a b b c
b a c a
c c a b
where we have;






































ς ≥ s1,6ς .
If (iii) s1,3ς = 2s
2,3
ς then by the last argument in the proof of Lemma B.1
we have a contradiction with Lemma B.4 that s1,6ς > s
2,6
ς .





We are now ready to state and prove the theorem by showing contradic-
tion of these findings.
Theorem 3. 1 There exists no Kemeny stable scoring rule.
Proof. Consider the following profile PN ;
1 1 1 1
a a b c
b c a b
c b c a
where we observe;





































N). But this implies s
5,6
ς = 0 which contradicts with
Lemma B.4 since s5,6ς = 0 =⇒ s1,6ς = s2,6ς by Lemma B.5.
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